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This paper demonstrates endogenous uctuations of aggregate investments when rm-level
investments follow an (S,s) policy and exhibit strategic complementarity. We present a
method to characterize the aggregate uctuations that arise from the interaction of the (S,s)
policies. A closed-form distribution function of the output growth rate is derived in general
environments. We show that the growth rate has a strictly positive variance even when the
number of rms tends to innity if the production exhibits constant returns to scale and the
real wage and interest rate are xed.
JEL classication code: E22, E32
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icality; fat-tailed distribution1 Introduction
This paper presents a method to analyze the endogenous uctuations of aggregate invest-
ments which arise from the interaction of the lumpy behavior of investments at the rm
level. It demonstrates that the endogenous aggregate uctuations can have a signicant
magnitude even when there are innitely many agents if the micro-level discrete investments
exhibit strategic complementarity. This result obtains when the strategic complementarity
overwhelms the law of large numbers eect in which idiosyncratic shocks quickly cancel out
with each other.
Recent developments in empirical studies on rm-level investments motivate this paper.
Researchers have shown the importance of the discrete investment in the course of a rm's
capital adjustment. Doms and Dunne (1998) found that the capital at the establishment level
is adjusted only occasionally but by a jump. This nding led macroeconomists to investigate
the aggregate consequence of the micro-level lumpy adjustments. For example, based on
the similar empirical ndings, Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999) and Caballero and
Engel (1999) highlighted the eects of the lumpy investments in the aggregate uctuation of
investments. This paper presents a model in which the lumpy investment plays the central
role to generate aggregate uctuations.
The question of how to analyze the aggregate uctuations that arise from micro-level
discreteness, or more generally, micro-level nonlinearity, has been tackled by the literature
on (S,s) economies and on interaction-based models independently. The (S,s) literature
has developed an analytical method for the aggregate uctuations without abstracting from
the agent heterogeneity (Caplin (1985); Caplin and Leahy (1997); Danziger (1999); Fisher
and Hornstein (2000); Thomas (2002); Khan and Thomas (2003)). Early development of
the theory on (S,s) economies (Caplin and Spulber (1987); Caballero and Engel (1991))
revealed a robust tendency that the distribution of agents in the inaction band converges to
1a uniform distribution in one-sided (S,s) economies in which the micro adjustment occurs only
in one direction. At the uniform distribution, the adjustment at the extensive margin works
exactly like the adjustment at the intensive margin, and thus the aggregate behavior does
not dier from the smoothly-adjusting case (the \neutrality" result). To the contrary, the
models of interactions and nonlinear dynamics have focused on the possibility of endogenous
uctuations arising from the micro-level nonlinearity, such as in Brock and Hommes (1997),
Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000), Brock and Durlauf (2001), and Topa (2001). This paper
develops a method to analyze the aggregate uctuations of an (S,s) economy by using the
intuition of the interaction-based models.
We employ a standard multi-sectoral business cycles model by Long and Plosser (1983)
to approach the question. Long and Plosser showed that the sectors can co-move without
any common shocks when they are linked by input-output relations. This qualitative co-
movement, however, has been questioned in terms of its quantitative signicance. Dupor
(1999) showed formally that the aggregate uctuation in the Long-Plosser economy follows
the law of large numbers, in which the aggregate variance shrinks linearly to the number of
sectors. Horvath (2000) argued that the law of large numbers eect can be slowed down by
a sparse input-output matrix. In this paper, we propose that a nonlinear response of rms
leads to an aggregation mechanism that is dierent from the intuition of the law of large
numbers.
We introduce lumpy capital adjustments in the multi-sectoral framework similar to Kiy-
otaki (1988) and Gal  (1994). The model consists of many monopolistic rms that produce
dierentiated goods. Suppose that a capital adjustment is a discrete decision. An invest-
ment by a rm increases the aggregate capital and output in the next period. Because of the
aggregate demand externality, the higher output induces the other rms to produce more in
the next period and thus to invest more in this period. Then, there is a chance of a chain
2reaction of investments in which one rm's investment triggers another's. We formalize this
chain reaction as a ctitious best response dynamics that converges to an equilibrium. The
size of the chain reaction depends on the conguration of rms' positions in the inaction
band. Even when the evolution of the conguration is solely driven by physical depreciation
of capital and occasional capital adjustments, the evolution of the aggregate capital can be
quite complex. By approximating the conguration by a vector of random variables, we
obtain the analytical characterization of aggregate investments.
This paper delivers the following results. First, an asymptotic distribution function of
the aggregate capital uctuation is derived when the number of rms tends to innity.
The distribution has a heavier tail than the normal distribution.1 The fat tail indicates
that the size of aggregate investment is sensitive to the detailed conguration of rms'
positions in the inaction band. This sensitivity to the detailed conguration causes the
aggregate investment to exhibit endogenous uctuations in the course of evolution of the
capital conguration driven by the depreciation and lumpy investments. Secondly, we show
that the variance of the aggregate uctuation does not vanish at the innite limit of the
number of rms when the technology exhibits constant returns to scale and when the wage
and interest rate are xed. Even though an economy consists of innitely many rms, the
nonlinear behavior at the rm level does not cancel out with each other in aggregation.
This result forms a striking contrast to the sectoral models which lack a strong amplication
mechanism of idiosyncratic shocks due to the law of large numbers. Thirdly, we compute
the equilibrium path numerically. This conrms the emergence of endogenous aggregate
1A similar distribution was derived in Nirei (2006). The present paper diers from the previous paper as
follows. First, this paper shows the non-zero asymptotic variance of the aggregate growth rate, which was
lacking in the previous paper. Secondly, this paper is worked out in a business cycles framework. Thirdly,
this paper eliminates the assumption in the previous paper that there are idiosyncratic shocks and that their
variance depends on the number of rms. This paper highlights the possibility of endogenous uctuations
that arise in the deterministic environment.
3uctuations in a completely deterministic environment. The sensitivity analysis shows that
constant-returns-to-scale is an important environment for the uctuations. When the wage
and interest rate are xed and returns to scale are constant, the equilibrium of the product
markets with monopolistic suppliers exhibits a \fragile" property. In this environment, the
size of the chain reaction of investments depends crucially on the detailed conguration of
the positions in the inaction band. The simulation also points to the presence of replacement
echo eects in the time series.
Important contributions precede this research on endogenous macroeconomic uctuations
due to the synchronized timing of rms' discrete actions. Shleifer (1986) demonstrated that
the event of synchronized actions can recur deterministically and endogenously through
self-fullling expectations of periodic adjustments. Jovanovic (1987) highlighted the case
where idiosyncratic shocks give rise to aggregate risks. Durlauf (1991, 1993) showed further
that the aggregate size of synchronized actions depends on the detailed conguration of
agents' states as well as can exhibit a long-run path-dependence. We extend this literature
by presenting a sharper characterization of the synchronization in a standard multisectoral
model. We obtain an analytical expression of the uctuation magnitude with parameters
which can be estimated from rm-level data. The model also identies a mechanism of
aggregate uctuations which does not rely on a strong informational coordination or a strong
nonlinearity such as the increasing returns to scale. The mechanism is best understood as
a globally-coupled case of self-organized criticality (Bak, Chen, Scheinkman, and Woodford
(1993); Scheinkman and Woodford (1994)). The dynamics of the capital prole organizes
itself to a critical conguration, recurringly, at which the distribution of the number of
synchronized rms exhibits a power-law tail.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simplied model and
the main results of the paper. Section 3 shows that the analytical results hold in a dynamic
4general equilibrium setup. Numerical simulations of deterministic equilibrium paths conrm
the analytical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Simple Model
2.1 Model
This section provides a simplied presentation of our model and main results on endoge-





Each rm is endowed with an initial capital ki;0 that is naturally depreciated at rate  before
it is available for current production. Each rm chooses an \investment" xi to adjust the
production level.2
ki = (1   )ki;0 + xi (2)














where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. The constant markup of rms is thus  
=(  1) > 1. Firm i's prot is dened as i = piyi  
PN
j=1 pjzi;j. Households own the rms
and collect all the prots. The representative household consumes a composite consumption
2Precisely speaking, xi should be called intermediate inputs rather than investments in this static model,
since xi takes the resources produced by using (ki). We will consider in Section 3 the case in which xi is
truly the investment that takes resources produced by using the capital in the previous period. We will see
that the results obtained in this static model still hold in the dynamic model.

































where   =. Note that Y = K by construction. By following




Finally, we assume that the rm's capital choice is restricted by a binary set:
ki 2 f(1   )ki;0;(1   )ki;0g (6)
where (1   ) > 1. The capital ki has to be either at the depreciated level (1   )ki;0 or
the depreciated level multiplied by the lumpiness parameter . This binary constraint is
equivalent to assuming that the rm can choose the gross investment rate xi=ki;0 only either
at (   1)(1   ) or 0, namely, a lumpy investment or an inaction. This constraint is a
shortcut for modeling the lumpy behavior which typically occurs as an optimal investment
policy under xed costs. This discreteness assumption is the only departure from the usual
model of monopolistic product markets. Our main objective is to examine the aggregate
consequence of the nonlinear behavior of rms induced by the discreteness constraint.
An equilibrium is dened as a pair of price vector (pi) and allocation (zi;j;zc;j) such




i i=N, that the rms maximize their prots i subject to the production function (1), the
6capital accumulation (2), the demand function for good i (5), and the discrete investment
(6), and that satises the equilibrium conditions yi =
P
j zj;i +zc;i for any good i. Note that
the levels of yi;ki;xi and their average variables are independent of N, whereas the derived
demands zc;j;zi;j are of order 1=N, due to the normalization of the CES functions (3,4) by
N.
We assume  >  so that the prot function is strictly concave with respect to ki. The
optimal strategy for a rm is to adjust the capital only if (1 )ki;0 is suciently away from
the \desired" level of capital that would maximize the prot if the capital were chosen from
a continuous set. Thanks to the discreteness assumption, we can easily derive the optimal
inaction range for capital ki. Let k denote the lower bound of the inaction band. The upper
bound is k. The optimal bounds must satisfy an indierence condition (k) = (k).








where a0 is a constant a0 = ((   1)=(   1))
1=(1 ). The parameter  represents the degree
of strategic complementarity among rms. We have the following property immediately.
Lemma 1   1 if and only if   1 where the double signs correspond with each other.
The spillover eect on the actual capital ki is nonlinear because of the threshold policy. The
average capital level K aects the threshold, but it may or may not induce an adjustment
of ki. The individual capital is insensitive to a small perturbation in the average capital,
while it synchronizes with the average capital if the perturbation is large. The strength of
the synchronization is determined by .
We restrict the support of the initial capital ki;0 to an inaction band in order to capture
7the stationary behavior of the model economy. In this way, only the rms whose initial
capital is near the lower bound will go below the inaction band due to the depreciation
and increase the capital by a jump. We further assume for our rst propositions that the
initial capital ki;0 is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution over the inaction band.
The randomness of the initial capital is interpreted as an idiosyncratic shock in this section,
whereas in the next section it is reinterpreted as an unconditional distribution of the capital
that evolves deterministically over time. Under the uniformity assumption, the equilibrium
aggregate capital can be derived as  K = (a0((   1)=(log))1=)1=(1 ) for  < 1 when
there are a continuum of rms. The lower bound of the inaction band is then  k = a0  K.
Thus, the uniformity assumption is expressed as follows.
Assumption 1 logki;0 is a random variable following a uniform distribution over [log  k;log+
log  k).
The uniformity assumption is not essential to our result, as we see later in Proposition 5.
However, the assumption not only simplies propositions greatly, but also corresponds to a
robust feature of one-sided (S,s) economies. Let si denote a rm's position in the inaction
band normalized by the band width: si = (logki   logk)=log. The position si always
takes a value between 0 and 1 at equilibrium. The uniform distribution of si is shifted to
itself if si is decreased by depreciation and if the rms follow the one-sided (S,s) policy, as
is the case in Caplin and Spulber (1987). Hence, the uniform distribution is an invariant
measure of si in a typical one-sided (S,s) model. This property holds in our case if there are
a continuum of rms: the equilibrium position si follows a uniform distribution if the initial
position si;0 = (logki;0   log  k)=log follows the uniform distribution. Moreover, Caballero
and Engel (1991) show that the position converges to the uniform distribution if its dynamics
contain a random component whose distribution attens over time. They also show that
the heterogeneity of lumpiness i (as well as the depreciation i in our model) contributes
8to the convergence of a cross-section distribution of si to the uniform distribution. We will
see in the dynamic model that the heterogeneity indeed drives si;t to follow the uniform
distribution.
The equilibrium condition is summarized by the inaction band: ki 2 [k;k) for all
i. An equilibrium is a mapping from the initial capital vector (ki;0) to the capital vector
(ki) that satises the inaction band. The probability measure for ki;0 and the equilibrium
mapping thus yield the probability measure for the equilibrium aggregate capital K. We will
focus on the aggregate uctuation that is represented by the distribution of the equilibrium
K. The equilibrium aggregate capital is a xed point of the aggregate reaction function  


















where Ke is an expected aggregate capital. Namely,  (Ke) represents the aggregate capital
when each rm optimally responds to the expected aggregate capital Ke. As depicted in
Figure 1,   is a non-decreasing step function.
We note that multiple equilibria may exist as shown by points A and B in Figure 1. We
need an equilibrium selection mechanism to pin down a unique solution for each draw of
initial capital prole. We dene two sets of the equilibrium selection mechanism. The rst
mechanism depends on the aggregate reaction function  :
Equilibrium Selection 1 For each initial capital vector, pick the equilibrium aggregate
capital K that has the minimum jK  K0j among equilibria K that satisfy sign(K  K0) =
sign( (K0)   K0).
This mechanism selects the equilibrium aggregate capital that is closest to the initial ag-











Figure 1: Aggregate reaction function  . K and K respectively show the equilibrium
selected by Equilibrium Selection 1 and 2.
aggregate capital. In the case of Figure 1, this mechanism selects point A. Vives (1990)
showed that the equilibrium selected by this mechanism can be reached as a convergent
point of the best response dynamics Ku =  (Ku 1) starting at K0. Cooper (1994) sup-
ported the use of this selection mechanism in macroeconomics on the grounds that the best
response dynamics is a realistic tatonnement process in a situation where many agents in-
teract with each other. The only information needed for an agent to make decisions in the
tatonnement is the aggregate capital level. Because of this parsimony on public information,
this selection mechanism excludes the possibilities of big jumps that arise from a purely
informational coordination among agents.
The second equilibrium selection mechanism we use is simpler:
Equilibrium Selection 2 For each initial capital vector, pick the equilibrium aggregate
capital K that has the minimum jK   K0j among all equilibria K.
10By this mechanism, we construct the least volatile uctuations of aggregate capital possible
in equilibrium. In Figure 1, this mechanism selects whichever K or K is the closer to
K0.
2.2 Results
In this section, we derive the distribution of the aggregate capital uctuations. We rst
analyze the uctuation of the equilibrium selected by the rst selection mechanism, and
then proceed to analyze the one selected by the second mechanism.
Dene q  log=jlog(1 )j as the natural frequency of the capital adjustment of a rm.
In a dynamic context, q is the number of periods between a rm's two successive adjustments
of capital when the aggregate capital is stationary. The inverse of the frequency, 1=q, is the
fraction of rms that engage in the lumpy investment in a period if there are a continuum
of rms distributed uniformly.
Dene m1  N(log (K0)   logK0)=log, which represents the initial gap in aggregate
capital measured in units of the number of rms. If m1 = 0, then K = K0 constitutes
the equilibrium aggregate capital. Otherwise, K 6= K0. Dene the equilibrium aggregate
capital growth rate g  logK logK0. We obtain the asymptotic probability distribution
of the capital growth rate as follows.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 and Equilibrium Selection 1, Ng converges in dis-
tribution to (m1 + M)log, where M conditional on m1 follows a symmetric probability
distribution function whose positive side (M = 1;2;:::) is:




11The tail of the distribution function is approximated by:






The initial gap m1=
p













The proof is deferred to Appendix C. Here we outline the proof in order to elicit the
mechanism behind the distribution. We utilize the best response dynamics of the capital
prole as a workhorse for characterizing the aggregate uctuations. The initial state and
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where Ku and k









Note that the denition of Ku is consistent with the aggregate response dynamics we dened
earlier: Ku =  (Ku 1). The mean number of rms that adjust in the rst step is Njlog(1 
)j=log. Their adjustments may or may not exactly balance with the aggregate capital
depreciation, i.e., K1 may not coincide with  (K0). If not, the optimal lower bound is
updated and the adjustments in the second step take place. This procedure is iterated until
12there are no more rms that newly adjust.
Dene mu for u = 2;3;:::;T as the number of rms that adjust capital upward in step
u. By convention, mu is negative if the rms adjust downward. The number of adjusting
rms are positive (negative) for all steps if m1 > 0 (m1 < 0). Dene M 
PT
u=2 mu as
the total number of rms that adjust capital subsequently after the initial deviation of K1
from K0. T is the stopping time of the best response dynamics, i.e., T  minu:mu=0 u. An
equilibrium capital vector is dened by the convergent point of the dynamics, ki = ki;T.
m1 + M indicates the total deviation of the investment from the stationary level in units of
the number of rms.
In the rst step toward Proposition 1, we show that the capital growth rate is asymptot-
ically proportional to the number of rms that adjust.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, N(logKu+1   logKu) converges to mu+1 log as N ! 1
almost surely for u = 1;2;:::;T   1.
Proof is in Appendix A. Lemma 2 implies that N(logK  logK0) ! (m1 +M)log. Thus,
the computation of the growth of aggregate capital reduces to counting the total number
of adjusting rms. We then show that the number of adjusting rms in the best response
dynamics asymptotically follows a Poisson branching process.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1, mu for u = 2;3;:::;T asymptotically follows a branching
process, in which each rm in mu bears rms in step u + 1 whose number follows a Poisson
distribution with mean .
Proof is in Appendix B. A branching process is an integer stochastic process of a population.
Each individual (\parent") in a generation bears a random number of \children" in the next
generation. In a Poisson branching process, the number of children borne by a parent is a
Poisson random variable. It is known that a branching process converges to 0 in a nite
13time with probability 1 if the mean number of children borne by a parent is less than or
equal to 1 (see Feller (1957)). This fact conrms that the best response dynamics stops in
a nite time T with probability 1 when   1. Thus, the best response dynamics is a valid
algorithm of equilibrium selection even when N ! 1.
The cumulative population size of the Poisson branching process is known to follow the
Borel-Tanner distribution (Kingman (1993)). By combining the Borel-Tanner distribution
with the Poisson distribution for m2, we obtain the desired distribution (10).
We approximate the tail part of the distribution (10) by (11) by applying Stirling's
formula. The distribution (11) shows that the normalized aggregate capital growth rate
conditional on m1 asymptotically follows a gamma-type distribution which combines a power
function w 1:5 and an exponential function e ( 1 log)w. Note that    1   log > 0 for
 < 1. Since the exponential function declines faster than the power function, the tail
distribution is dominated by the exponential when  < 1. By Lemma 1, the condition  < 1
is equivalent to the decreasing returns to scale. As the returns-to-scale becomes constant,
 becomes one. In that case, the exponential part disappears, and thus the distribution
converges to a pure power law.
In fact, the total population of any branching process is known to follow the gamma-type
distribution with the power exponent 0.5 as in (11). The gamma-type often appears as the
distribution for waiting time. The distribution of population in branching processes is closely
related to the distribution of the rst return time of a random walk, which has the same
power-law exponent 0.5. In our case, the total number of adjusting rms is characterized by
the waiting time for the best response dynamics to converge.
The gamma-type distribution implies a heavier tail than the normal distribution and an
excess kurtosis. Thus our distribution is consistent with the nding of Caballero and Engel
(1999) that the empirical investment rates at the sectoral level have excess kurtosis. They
14also found the skewness, which can be generated in our model when the initial distribution
of capital is not uniform. Khan and Thomas (2003) obtained the excess kurtosis and the
skewed response of the aggregate investment by numerically simulating a lumpy investment
model under xed prices. Our model shares the feature that the response of the aggregate
investment to shocks depends on the cross-section distribution of capital.
Whether the tail obeys an exponential decay or a power decay has important implications
for the moments of the distribution, since the existence of moments is determined by the tail
behavior. If the tail decays exponentially, then any -th moment exists, because
R 1
0 xe xdx
is a gamma function and thus nite. To the contrary, if the tail decays in power with
exponent , then only the moments lower than the -th exist, since
R 1 xx  1dx is nite
only for  < . For our case where the exponent of the power law is 0.5, even the mean
diverges if there is no exponential truncation.
The degree of strategic complementarity, , determines the speed of exponential trun-
cation of the distribution. At  = 1, the exponential term disappears and the distribution
becomes a pure power law without nite mean. This is because the mean number of chil-
dren per parent, that is equal to , determines the trend growth of the population in the
branching process. The population size of the n-th generation has mean n if the population
is originated by one individual. The population diverges to innity with a positive probabil-
ity when the process is supercritical,  > 1, whereas the population decreases to zero with
probability 1 if subcritical,  < 1. Thus,  = 1 is the critical point at which the population
size decreases to zero with probability 1 and yet the mean population size diverges.
The possibility of a power-law distribution of sectoral propagation was rst pointed out
by Bak et al. (1993) along the line of literature on self-organized criticality. The point of the
literature is that the critical phenomena, which are broadly associated with the power-law
distributions, can occur at the sink of a class of dynamical systems, whereas such criticality
15had been believed to require a ne tuning of parameters. The \self-organization" mechanism
to arrive at a critical point can be interpreted as the convergence of si to the uniform
distribution in a dynamic version of our model. The result diers in the exponent of the
power-law distribution, which is 0:5 in our model and 1=3 in Bak et al. The dierence
arises from the topology of the network. Bak et al. assumed a two-dimensional lattice
network in which two avalanches started from neighboring sites can overlap. This leads
to the longer chain of reaction and thus the atter power-law tail. Our model features a
standard equilibrium market model that is essentially dimensionless in the rms' network
and thus corresponds to an innite-dimension case of the lattice models which yields the
exponent 0:5 (Grimmett (1999)).
The distribution of M conditional on m1 converges to a pure power-law distribution as
 approaches to 1. With the exponent 0:5, the power-law distribution does not have either
mean or variance. The conditioning variable m1, which is the initial gap in the best response
dynamics, obeys the law of large numbers and its variance decreases linearly in N. It turns
out that these two eects cancel out in the unconditional variance of (m1 + W)=N, as we
state in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that g follows the distribution in Proposition 1. Then, the standard




Proof is deferred to Appendix D. The main idea is following. Proposition 1 showed that
m1=
p
N asymptotically follows a normal distribution with nite variance. This implies that
the absolute value jm1j has mean that scales as
p
N. Namely, the average initial gap of
the best response dynamics in units of the number of rms increases as
p
N. Proposition 1
also showed that Ng=log   m1 conditional on m1 = 1 follows the power-law distribution
with exponent 0.5 if  = 1. Then, the variance of Ng conditional on m1 = 1 diverges
16as N1:5, because
R N x2x 1:5dx  N1:5. Combining these two results, we obtain that Ng
unconditional on m1 has variance scaling as N2, since Ng can be divided into
p
N sets
of sub-population each of which has variance that scales as N1:5. Hence the variance of g
scales as N0.
The argument above shows that the power-law distribution is essential to obtain the
non-trivial variance of g. The key environment that induces the emergence of the power
law is  = 1, or equivalently, the constant returns to scale  = 1. It appears counterintuitive
that the aggregate variance does not converge to zero when there are only idiosyncratic
shocks to the initial capital. However, it is a natural consequence of the usual properties
of equilibrium under the constant returns to scale. At the equilibrium factor prices, rms
cannot determine the optimal size of production under the constant returns to scale, because
rms are indierent across production levels. Thus, any level of production can happen at
the equilibrium factor price. The equilibrium is determinate in our model because of the
frictions in rms' behavior. The indeterminacy of the constant returns to scale economy
reappears, however, in the form of the power-law distribution. The power-law distribution is
scale-free, i.e., the shape of the distribution does not depend on the measuring unit.3 Due to
the scale-free property, the economy experiences non-trivial uctuations of the synchronized
adjustments of rms regardless of the size of the economy.
The limit standard deviation of the growth rate in Proposition 2 is determined by the
lumpiness parameter  and the periodicity q of the capital oscillation at the rm level.
Numerical examples for the standard deviation are shown in Table 1. First, we note that
the uctuation magnitude shows little dependence on the markup rate. In fact the standard
deviation is not signicantly changed even when the markup rate goes to innity, at which
2
1 is simplied to (1 1=q)=q. This implies that the lumpiness parameter log has an almost
3Newman (2005) provides an illuminating survey of the scale-free distribution and the power law as well
as the critical phenomena and the self-organized criticality.
17markup (   1) 0.02 0.2
lumpiness (log) 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2
4 0.92 2.29 4.56 9.07 0.92 2.29 4.57 9.10
periodicity (q) 6 0.82 2.04 4.07 8.11 0.82 2.04 4.08 8.13
8 0.75 1.87 3.73 7.43 0.75 1.87 3.73 7.44
Table 1: Limit standard deviations of aggregate capital growth rate (percent)
proportional eect on the standard deviation when the periodicity q is held constant.
Secondly, Table 1 suggests that the empirically plausible range of lumpiness can generate
the magnitude of uctuations observed in the business cycles frequency. There exist some
empirical estimates for the lumpiness of capital adjustments. Doms and Dunne (1998)
observe that over half of the plants in their data experience an annual capital adjustment
of at least 37% of the capital. Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999) report that 20% of
plants experience the gross investment-capital ratio more than 20% each year, which account
for almost 50% of aggregate investment. Based on this observation, they choose 20% as a
suitable threshold for dening a lumpy investment. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) report that
the plant Herndahl (the representative share of a plant's employment in an industry) is
2.8%. The plant Herndahl may be interpreted as the lumpiness of investments if a capital
adjustment is carried out by adjusting the number of plants. The aggregate uctuation
shown in Table 1 is sizable even for such small lumpiness.
Proposition 2 shows that the uctuations of growth rates do not degenerate at the innite
limit of N if  = 1. The criticality condition  = 1 is equivalent to the constant returns
to scale  = 1 by Lemma 1. We also note that the competitiveness of the market, , does
not aect whether  is at the critical level. In this sense, the returns to scale determines
the \phase" of the spillover eects, whereas the markup rate only modies the degree of
complementarity without altering the phase. The criticality condition  = 1 is interpreted
18as the case of perfect strategic complementarity across rms. By perfect complementarity
we mean that a proportional increase in capital of all the other rms induces the same
proportional increase in capital of a rm, if the increment is larger than the lumpiness. A
shock smaller than the lumpiness, however, does not cause a symmetric movement across
rms. Thus, the rm's investment behavior at the criticality may be summarized as the
local inertia combined with the global perfect strategic complementarity.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that, no matter how large the aggregative system is, the
nonlinearity of the individual behaviors can add up to non-degenerate aggregate uctuations.
This is the theme pursued by Jovanovic (1987). His idea is that the multiplier eect, 1=(1 
) in our model, can be large enough to amplify an idiosyncratic shock to an aggregate
uctuation if  approaches to 1 as 1 1=
p
N. Our model shares the basic environment that
the degree of strategic complementarity  needs to approach to one. Our model diers in
that the rm's response is nonlinear to the aggregate capital. The nonlinearity renders the
multiplier eect quite sensitive to the detailed conguration of capital. It turns out that
the multiplier eect follows a heavy tailed distribution, which causes the average multiplier
eect to be the size of Jovanovic's. Thus, the idiosyncratic shocks are not simply magnied
to the aggregate risks in our model. The essential factor for the aggregate uctuations is the
conguration of capital that determines the magnitude of the realized multiplier eect. In
this sense, our result is analogous to Durlauf (1991).
Finally, we investigate the uctuation magnitude of g  logK logK0, the aggregate
capital growth rate when the equilibrium is selected by Equilibrium Selection 2. We obtain
the following result.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1 and Equilibrium Selection 2, for a region of arbitrarily
large N, there exists  < 1 such that the convergence of the variance of g to zero is not
faster than 1=
p
N if   .
19Proof: For any large N, there exists  close enough to 1 such that the exponential part in
(11) has a negligible impact on the probability distribution for the region below N. Now
consider the case  (K0) > K0 depicted in Figure 1. K is dened as the xed point of  
on the opposite side of K0 from K. There exists a point between K and K0 at which  
crosses the 45 degree line from below such as point C in Figure 1. By applying Proposition
1, the number of adjusting rms between B and C in Figure 1 follows the power law with
exponent 0.5 if  = 1. Then, the tail distribution of jgj cannot decay faster than the
power function with exponent 0.5.
Suppose that jgj follows the power-law tail with exponent 0.5. Since jgj and jgj
are asymptotically independent conditional on m1 and since jgj = minfjgj;jgjg, we
then have that Pr(minfjgj > g j m1) = Pr(jgj > g j m1)Pr(jgj > g j m1) /
g 0:5g 0:5 = g 1. At the power exponent 1, the variance of g conditional on m1 de-
creases as
R N x2x 2dx=N2  1=N. We know that the mean of jm1j increases as
p
N. Then,
proceeding as the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain that the variance of g decreases as
1=
p
N. If the tail distribution of g decays more slowly than the power law with exponent
0.5, the variance of g also decreases more slowly than 1=
p
N. 2
Proposition 3 shows that, if we choose the least volatile equilibrium, the variance of
the capital growth rate decreases to zero as N increases, but at the rate slower than the
central limit theorem predicts. This again opens up the theoretical possibility that the
lumpy investment at the micro level contributes to sizable aggregate uctuations.
The slow decline of the variance corresponds to the empirical nding by Canning, Amaral,
Lee, Meyer, and Stanley (1998) that the log standard deviation of GDP growth rates declines
at the slope as at as  0:15 when plotted against the log GDP across countries. Regional
data also show this pattern. Figure 2 plots the standard deviation of the growth rates of the


















































Least squares fit to the states
Figure 2: Dependence of the standard deviations of growth rates on the economy size
statistics were compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The state-level standard
deviation has a slightly negative relation with the GSP size. If the state-specic uctuations
are entirely driven by the idiosyncratic technological shocks as in the Long-Plosser model,
then the standard deviation should decline as a square root of the size of the economy as
shown by Dupor (1999). Thus, the linear t to the plot should have slope  0:5. However,
the slope estimated by the linear regression is as at as  0:24 (standard error 0:05). If we
match the empirical slope by incorporating the aggregate shocks in the Long-Plosser model,
then we need to assume that most of the state-specic uctuations are due to the state-level
aggregate shocks. Thus, the empirical pattern of the state uctuations is hard to reconcile
with the standard disaggregated model. The pattern is consistent with our model, however,
in which the standard deviation of g declines at rate  0:25.
Let us nally examine the overall magnitude of the regional volatility in Figure 2. The
standard deviation of the dierence between the GSP growth rates and the US GDP growth
rate is averaged as 1:19% across states. This magnitude falls in the range of the simulated
21standard deviations shown in Table 2 in Section 3.2 even though the number of operating
manufacturing plants in the US amounts to be about 350000 (Cooper, Haltiwanger, and
Power (1999)). It is thus quantitatively possible that the aggregate regional uctuations with
the magnitude of empirical business cycles endogenously arise from the complementarity of
discrete investments.
Propositions 1 and 2 are robust in a more general setup where the initial capital is not
distributed uniformly and the lumpiness and the depreciation rate are heterogeneous across
rms. We defer these generalizations to Appendix F.
3 Dynamic Model
In this section, we construct a dynamic model in which the distribution of capital evolves over
time deterministically due to the depreciation and lumpy investments. We use the standard
business cycles model with monopolistic rms as in Gal  (1994). First, we reestablish our
analytical results in this framework. We observe that the wage and interest rate can dampen
the investment amplication eects by lowering the degree of strategic complementarity.
This corresponds to the general equilibrium eect identied by Thomas (2002). Second,
we consider the case when the wage and interest rate are held constant, and compute the
equilibrium path numerically. We observe that the endogenous deterministic uctuation
emerges. We also conrm that the uniform distribution provides a good approximate for an
unconditional distribution of the rms' positions in the inaction band.
223.1 Model and the uctuation result






The returns to scale is  = +. Capital is accumulated over time as in (2). The investment




















t =(1   )   Ht). The representative household maximizes the utility
subject to the sequence of budget constraints:
N X
i=1
pi;tzc;i;t = wtHt + t; 8t (17)
where wt denotes the real wage and t is the average dividend from rms: t 
PN
i=1 i;t=N.
Aggregate indices Yt, Kt, and Pt = 1 are dened similarly as before, by redening  
(   )=(   ). The new denition of  corresponds to the old one in the simple model
when  is set at 0. Aggregate investment is Xt 
PN
i=1 xi;t=N. The labor market equilibrium
condition is Ht =
PN
i=1 hi;t=N. The usual procedure yields a demand function for good i as
(5).
The monopolist maximizes its discounted future prots as instructed by the represen-
tative household. The instructed discount rate, r
 1
t , is the marginal rate of intertemporal



















subject to the production function, the capital accumulation, the discreteness of the invest-
ment rate, and the demand function. By using the optimality condition for hi;t, the prot









i;t   ki;t+1 + (1   )ki;t (19)
where a0  (1   =)(A(=))1=(1 ). The present discounted value of prots is concave
in ki;t due to  < 1. Thus the optimal policy is characterized by an inaction band of ki;t
with a lower bound k
i;t and an upper bound ik
i;t. Consider two sequences of ki; which
are identical except at  = t. Such sequences can be constructed by assigning a positive
investment at t   1 and zero investment at t in one sequence and zero investment at t   1
and a positive investment at t in the other sequence. Then the lower bound is derived by
solving for k
i;t at which the two sequences yield the same discounted prot. Namely, if ki;t
is strictly less than k
i;t, the rm is better o by adjusting it upward rather than waiting.
Assign ki;t = k
i;t to the sequence that has zero investment at t   1, and ki;t = ik
i;t to the
other sequence. Then the both sequences have the same amount of capital at t 1 and t+1:
ki;t 1 = (1=(1 ))k
i;t and i(1 )k
i;t. Solving for k
i;t which equates the discounted prots
of the two sequences, we obtain:
k
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24where ai  (a0(

i 1)=(i 1))1=(1 ). Equation (20) expresses the strategic complementarity
between Kt and k
i;t, whereas the degree of complementarity is represented by  . Note that
  reduces to  in the simple model when  = 0. Lemma 1 continues to hold for  , namely,
   1 if and only if   1.






































(1   ) (26)





where cY  (A(=))
1=(1 ). It is hard to compute the perfect foresight equilibrium path,
since the future prices depend on the vector of individual capital rather than the aggregate
capital. Thus we approximate the expectation formations of agents on the future prices.
First, agents are assumed to expect that si; for  > t follows a uniform random variable
over the unit interval independently across i. Secondly, agents expect that w for  > t
obeys a log-linearized dynamics around the steady state. Thus, when the rms decide the
investment in t (and thus the capital in t+1), they rely on the forecasted factor price sequence
that is the log-linearized equilibrium transition path to the steady state in the economy with
a continuum of rms distributed uniformly over the inaction band in each period.
25When si;t follows a uniform distribution, (25) and (26) are simplied as follows:





t+1 (rt+1   1 + )
 1=(1 ) (29)




i=(logi))1= and cX = E((i   1)ai=logi)=cK in which the







t   cX(Kt+1   (1   )Kt) (30)
Then Equations (22,29,30) determine the equilibrium path of aggregate capital. There exists
the steady state (  K;  w) of this dynamics.
We log-linearize the dynamics around the steady state. Let us dene v  d ~ K0=d ~ K =
d ~ w0=d ~ w where tilde denotes the log-dierence of the variables to their steady state values.

























































The speed of convergence v can be solved explicitly when  = 1 (and thus   = 1) as
v = (1   )=(1   (1   )). Since this is strictly less than one, the dynamics is stable in
the neighborhood of the steady state.
Let us focus on the constant returns to scale case  = 1. The rms expect wt+1 to be
26consistent with the forecasted equilibrium path: ~ wt+1 = w ~ Kt+1. Equation (32) indicates
that the real wage is procyclical in the forecasted path. Thus, an upward deviation of
Kt+1 from the steady state raises the expected wt+1. The contemporaneous wage wt is
determined by (23,24). An increased aggregate investment in t lowers the contemporaneous
consumption, which raises the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
and thus reduces the real wage. Both the increase in wt+1 and the decrease in wt induces rt+1
to rise in response to an increased Kt+1. Due to the increased wt+1 and rt+1, the threshold
k
i;t+1 decreases by (27) and dampens the incentive to invest. This is the general equilibrium
eect that reduces the strategic complementarity across rms' investments. Let r;t+1 denote
the elasticity of equilibrium interest rate to capital in t + 1: r;t+1  d~ rt+1=d ~ Kt+1. By using




i;t = ^  ~ Kt (33)
^      
w + (1   )r;t+1
(1   )(1   )
(34)
The strategic complementarity is now lowered to ^  due to the general equilibrium eects if
w;r;t+1 > 0.
The equilibrium of goods markets, given the expected factor prices (wt+1;rt+1), is de-
termined by a capital prole which satises the inaction band ki;t+1 2 [k
i;t+1;ik
i;t+1). The
capital conguration determines the forecasted equilibrium factor prices in turn. We re-
dene the equilibrium selection algorithm, in which the capital prole starts at (ki;t)i and
converges to (ki;t+1)i, by incorporating the adjustment of (wt+1;rt+1) according to the log-
linearized pricing functions. Namely, the factor prices are updated in each step u during the
best response dynamics as ~ wu
t = w ~ Ku
t and ~ ru
t = r;t+1 ~ Ku
t . The initial point of the equilib-
27rium selection algorithm is set at K0
t =  K(Kt=  K)v which would be the aggregate capital if
there were a continuum of rms distributed uniformly at t. Then we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that  and  are common across i. Also suppose that logki;t is a
random variable which follows a uniform distribution over the inaction band [logk
i;t;log+
logk
i;t). Then, the distributions in Proposition 1 hold with modied ^  and ^ 1 for 0 < ^  < 1.
Also, logKt+1   logKt has a strictly positive variance when ^  ! 1 and N ! 1.
Proof proceeds similarly to that of Proposition 1.
The aggregate capital uctuates along with the evolution of conguration of the capital
prole. To evaluate the magnitude of uctuations analytically, we regarded the capital con-
guration as a vector of independent random variables that takes values within the inaction
band. Then, we obtain that the parametric form of the uctuation does not change from the
static case, and that the aggregate uctuation does not vanish as the number of rms tends
to innity if the key parameter ^  is one. ^  is equal to one when, for example, the returns to
scale is constant ( = 1) and the wage and interest rate are predetermined (w = r = 0).
The premise of Proposition 4 is that the log capital in period t is distributed randomly
and uniformly across an (S,s) band. Because the capital in t is random only up to the initial
capital in the model, this premise needs to be put in a reasonable context. We rely on the
nding that the uniform distribution is the stable invariant measure under the one-sided (S,s)
rule (Caplin and Spulber (1987); Caballero and Engel (1991); Nirei (2006)). Consider a log
gap (normalized by the log lumpiness) between the actual capital and the lower bound of the
(S,s) band that is dened in the counterpart economy with a continuum of rms. We draw
each rm's gap in t = 0 randomly from a uniform distribution, and let the system evolve
according to the (S,s) rule and the capital depreciation. It is not that rm i takes its own gap
random; rm i knows i's gap for any period t. Yet, rm i's gap in t is a random variable that
28follows the uniform distribution unconditionally. Moreover, if  and/or  are heterogeneous,
or if there are persistent idiosyncratic shocks, those factors help the gap distribution to
converge to the uniform distribution from any initial distribution. Thus, Proposition 4 can
be interpreted as a characterization of the uctuation of aggregate capital unconditional
on particular realizations of the gap variables. It still requires verication whether this
unconditional uctuation represents the time-series uctuation, because the cross-section
distribution of log capital in any t is a deterministic, yet complex, transformation of the
initial capital. We verify the premise by the numerical simulation in Section 3.2.
The crucial feature of the model is that the marginal product of capital is heterogeneous
across rms due to the lumpy investment. The marginal product of capital would be equal-
ized across rms if the capital adjustment were continuous. When the investment is lumpy,
the cost of capital is equalized at the extensive margin of the marginal product of capital.
The marginal product of capital for an individual rm is dependent on the level of aggregate
capital, and thus the rms' investments exhibit strategic complementarity given the cost of
capital. The extent of the amplication eects of the strategic complementarity depends on
the distribution of rms around the extensive margin.
The complementarity parameter ^  is lowered from   by the general equilibrium eects
w and r;t+1. If the factor prices co-move with aggregate investments, the exponential
truncation of the distribution of aggregate uctuations becomes faster, and thus the variance
is smaller, than in the case of xed factor prices. The static model shows that the aggregate
uctuations do not vanish even when there are an innite number of rms if the returns to
scale is constant. Whether this mechanism of endogenous uctuations holds in the dynamic
general equilibrium model depends on how elastically the wage and interest rate respond to
the investments. Note that r;t+1 = w w;t where w;t  dlog ~ wt=dlog ~ Kt+1. If we calibrate
these elasticities by using the benchmark value  = 3, the general equilibrium eect turns
29out to overwhelm the strategic complementarity eect  . In this case, ^  becomes negative,
and our equilibrium selection algorithm does not necessarily converge to the equilibrium. We
can interpret this result as the case where the reluctance of households to substitute their
consumption intertemporally dominates the rm's gain from synchronized investments. A
small change in factor prices quickly dampens the rms' incentive to follow other rms'
investments. On the contrary, if we calibrate w and w;t by empirical correlations between
~ Yt+1 and ~ wt+1 or ~ wt which tend to be low, then ^  becomes positive.
The dampening force of the general equilibrium eect is sensitive to how the agents
form their expectations. Let us consider the following illustrative case. When  = 1, the
forecasted relation of factor prices (29) reduces to a familiar condition:
w





that must hold between the wage and the interest rate in any model with competitive factor
markets with constant returns to scale. This relation holds regardless of the capital level.
Note that the left hand side of this relation summarizes the eect of factor prices on the lower
bound k
i;t+1 in (20). Thus, as long as the factor prices are constrained by this relation, their
movement does not aect the incentive for a rm to invest. The rms expect this relation
to hold only in  > t + 1 in the previous approximation of the future price path. Suppose
now that the rms expect this relation to hold in t + 1 as well. Then, the rms' investment
exhibits the perfect complementarity ^  =   = 1, which is the condition for our aggregate
uctuations in the limit of N ! 1 to obtain. This alternative expectation formation has
a particular relevance when the interest rate is exogenously determined as in a small open
economy.
The perfect complementarity also emerges if  = 1 and if there are real rigidities in the
wage and interest rate. In an economy where the factor employment contract is predeter-
30mined, for example, then ^  = 1 holds for the frequency higher than the length of contract
terms. Thus, the endogenous uctuations of aggregate investments due to the strategic
complementarity of lumpy investments may occur in a general equilibrium in the limit of
N ! 1 if there are real rigidities in expected factor prices.
3.2 Granular dynamics in regional economies with locally dier-
entiated goods
We have so far assumed the randomness of the capital conguration in order to obtain the
analytical solution for the distribution of aggregate uctuations. We assumed a uniform
distribution for Propositions 1, 2, and 4 and we generalized the proposition for an arbitrary
distribution in Propositions 5 and 6. We showed that the aggregate investment is sensitive
to the detailed conguration of capital in that environment.
In this section, we drop the assumption of randomized capital and show that the uc-
tuation results still hold in the equilibrium path where the capital evolves deterministically.
We do so by numerically computing the equilibrium path when the wage and interest rate
are xed at the time-average level. We interpret the xed wage and interest as a situation
of regional economies in which the prices of locally dierentiated products adjust exibly
while the wage and interest are exogenously determined by the national economy due to
the perfect mobility of labor and capital across regions. We show that the aggregate output
exhibits uctuations along with the evolution of the capital conguration which is driven
by the depreciation of capital and lumpy investments. Since the aggregate uctuation is
driven by discrete actions of nite rms, we may call the uctuation as granular dynamics.
Gabaix (2005) nds a granular eect in aggregate output uctuations as the inuence of big
rms. In this paper, the aggregate uctuation rather arises from interaction of small, but
not atomless, granular rms.
31Parameter values are specied as follows. The labor's share of income = is equal to 0.58.
The markup rate  1 is set at 0.2. The inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is set at  = 3. The quarterly discount factor is set at  = 0:99. The returns-to-scale  takes
various values close to one. The quarterly depreciation rate of capital i is drawn from a
normal distribution with mean 0:02 and standard deviation 0:01, where the parameter values
are obtained from the table of estimated depreciation rates of SIC 2-digit level industries
shown in Horvath (2000). The distribution of lumpiness i is similarly obtained by tting
an exponential distribution to the estimated investment-capital ratios shown in Cooper,
Haltiwanger, and Power (1999). The mean i is set at 0:2 and the distribution is truncated
below at 0:1 so that the condition i(1   i) > 1 is satised.
We draw each rm's initial log capital randomly and independently from an identical
distribution function. We also draw each rm's lumpiness and depreciation parameters ran-
domly from calibrated distribution functions. Once drawn, the lumpiness and depreciation
parameters are xed for all the periods. There is no further randomness in the system. Then
we compute the (S,s) policy and the equilibrium path for 500 quarters. First 100 quarters are
discarded, and the moments of our interest are computed. We repeat this entire process for
100 times by drawing initial capital and heterogenous parameters from the same distribution
functions. We then take the averages and standard deviations of the moments across the
simulated runs.
This experiment shows that (1) the aggregate time-series is stationary, non-periodic, and
volatile as much as predicted by Proposition 4, and (2) the distribution of log capital is close
to uniform in any period. These results are summarized in Figure 3. The left panel plots a
sample equilibrium path for the case N = 10000 and  = 0:999. We observe a considerable
uctuation of the output despite the large number of rms.
We compute the standard deviation and the autocorrelation of Y for each path, and
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Figure 3: Left: Simulated path of output Y when N = 10000 and  = 0:999. Right:
Cross-section distribution of simulated si;t
repeat the procedure for 100 times for each parameter set. Table 2 reports the average
and standard error of the computed standard deviations and autocorrelations of output for
various number of rms N and returns to scale . The standard errors of the estimates are
reported in parentheses. Table 2 conrms our analytical result that the amplitude of the
uctuation increases as the returns-to-scale approaches to one. The amplitude decreases as
the number of rms increases, but even for the case of 100,000 rms the model can generate
Standard deviation of Y (%) Autocorrelation of Y (%)
 0.9 0.99 0.999 0.9 0.99 0.999
1,000 0.19 1.05 2.24 55.43 76.72 93.69
(0.01) (0.07) (0.29) (4.16) (3.92) (1.71)
N 10,000 0.06 0.42 1.68 55.05 72.81 88.35
(0.00) (0.02) (0.15) (3.62) (3.78) (2.38)
100,000 0.02 0.15 0.99 54.23 69.67 83.03
(0.00) (0.05) (0.19) (3.96) (4.00) (2.93)
Table 2: Standard deviation and autocorrelation of output
33sizable uctuations. As we discussed along with Figure 2, the magnitudes of uctuations in
the US regions are consistent with the simulated statistics above.
We check whether the uniform distribution approximates the cross-section of si;t well.
The right panel of Figure 3 plots the cumulative distributions of si;t for various periods t.
The simulated distributions hardly deviate from the uniform distribution. This provides a
ground for the uniformity assumption in our analysis in previous sections.
Even though the gap variable si;t has a strong tendency to converge toward the uniform
distribution, a slight deviation always occurs in a nite economy and the detailed change
in the conguration of si;t aects the aggregate investment signicantly. Moreover, the fact
that si;t is serially correlated by construction leads to an interesting dynamic property of the
aggregates. We observe in Table 2 that the model generates considerable autocorrelation
in output. Since there is no autocorrelation built in the environment, we interpret this as
the replacement echo eects, following Benhabib and Rustichini (1991) and Boucekkine,
Germain, and Licandro (1997), in which the past clustering of capital adjustments brings
out repercussions when the cluster comes back to the adjustment threshold. The simple
principle of \phase-dynamics" in the weakly-coupled nonlinear systems might be useful to
interpret this periodicity. The aggregate uctuation occurs only if there is a certain degree of
comovement across agents. Therefore, the frequency of aggregate uctuations should center
around the average frequency of the natural rate of adjustment of a rm, which in our model
is determined by the lumpiness size divided by the depreciation rate: qi = logi=jlog(1 i)j.
In sum, the synchronization of oscillating capital alone can generate signicant amplitude
and autocorrelation of the aggregate output uctuations, while the signicant heterogeneity
in lumpiness and depreciation rates across rms prevents the capital from being completely
synchronized.
344 Conclusion
This paper characterizes the aggregate uctuations arising from spillover eects of discrete
investments at the rm level. We evaluate the deterministic uctuation of aggregate in-
vestment along the evolution of heterogeneous capital as if it is a stochastic uctuation
whose randomness arises from the stochastic conguration of capital. For each congura-
tion, the equilibrium aggregate investment is determined as a convergent point of a ctitious
best response dynamics of rms' investment decisions. The best response dynamics can be
embedded in a branching process with the probability measure dened by the stochastic con-
guration. This enables us to derive the distribution function of the aggregate uctuation
in a closed form.
The uctuation of the number of investing rms is shown to follow a power-law distri-
bution with an exponential truncation at the tail. The truncation speed is determined by
the degree of strategic complementarity among rms, which is ultimately determined by the
returns to scale of production technology. Under the constant returns to scale, the distribu-
tion becomes a pure power law, and the standard deviation of the growth rate is shown to
be strictly positive even when there are an innite number of rms. The limiting standard
deviation is shown to be almost proportional to the lumpiness of the rm-level investment.
The equilibrium path of the model is numerically computed without making the ran-
domness assumption of the capital conguration. The simulation conrms the validity of
the analysis above that utilizes the assumptions of randomness and uniformity of the capi-
tal conguration. The simulated output paths show strong persistence and mild periodicity.
This expresses the echo eect in which a clustering of investments in a period reappears after
several periods. The frequency of the echo eect is determined by the natural frequency of a
rm's capital adjustment, which is equal to the lumpiness divided by the depreciation rate.
35Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 2
Let Hu, u = 2;3;:::;T, denote the set of rms that adjust capital in step u. Assume that
Hu is nite with probability one when N ! 1, which we verify later. We consider the case
m1 > 0 for the proofs of Lemma 2, 3, and Proposition 1 without loss of generality. Thus,
logki;u = logki;u 1 + log for i 2 Hu.
We expand N(logKu+1 logKu) around (logku)i2Hu+1. The rst derivative is @N logKu=@ logki;u =
(ki;u=Ku). Thus @Ku=@ki;u is of order 1=N. The second and higher derivatives with respect
to the own logki;u are @n(ki;u=Ku)=@ logkn
i;u = n(ki;u=Ku)+O(@Ku=@ki;u) for n = 1;2;:::.
The second cross derivatives, @2 logKu=(@ logki;u@ logkj;u), are of order @Ku=@kj;u and thus
O(1=N). Similarly, the cross derivative terms with respect to the capital of h distinct rms in
Hu+1 are of order 1=Nh 1. Since Hu+1 is nite, the n-th derivative of N logKu has the nite
number of the cross derivative terms for any nite n. Hence, the Taylor series expansion of




















where we used  = 0 +
P1








i=1 si;u=N). The denominator converges to
E[si;u] as N ! 1 almost surely by the law of large numbers, and we have E[si;u] =
R 1
0 si;udsi;u = ( 1)=(log). The numerator,
P
i2Hu+1 si;u, converges to mu+1 for every
event when Hu+1 is nite, because si;u is smaller than (logKu   logKu 1)=log for any
i 2 Hu+1 and thus of order 1=N. Hence we obtain the lemma.
36B Proof of Lemma 3
The conditional probability for rm i to invest in u = 2;3;:::;T is:
Pr(i 2 Hu j i = 2 [v=2;3;:::;u 1Hv) =
(logKu   logKu 1)=log
1   (logKu 1   logK0)=log
: (37)
Thus mu follows a binomial distribution with population N  
Pu 1
v=2 mv and probability (37).
The mean of mu converges to mu 1 as N ! 1, by using Lemma 2. Then, the binomial
distribution of mu converges to a Poisson distribution with mean mu 1 for u = 2;3;:::;T.
Since a Poisson distribution is innitely divisible, the Poisson variable with mean mu 1 is
equivalent to a mu 1-times convolution of a Poisson variable with mean . Thus the process
mu for u = 2;3;:::;T is a branching process with a Poisson random variable with mean ,
where m2 follows a Poisson distribution with mean m1. Note that m1 is not included in
the branching process because it is not necessarily an integer.
C Proof of Proposition 1
We rst derive the asymptotic distribution of M conditional on m1. It is known that the
accumulated sum M =
PT
u=2 mu of the Poisson branching process conditional on m2 follows
an innitely divisible distribution called Borel-Tanner distribution (see Kingman (1993)):
Pr(M = w j m2) = (m2=w)e
 w(w)
w m2=(w   m2)! (38)
37for w = m2;m2 + 1;:::. Using that m2 follows the Poisson distribution with mean m1, we
obtain (10) as follows:

























where the third line utilized the binomial theorem. The approximation in (11) is obtained














and using (1 + m1=w)w 1 ! em1 as w ! 1.
Next we derive the asymptotic normal distribution of m1=
p














)ki;0)=N)1=   logK0). The second term represents the depreciation and is equal to
(
p
N=log)log(1   ) =  
p
N=q. The rst term represents the rst-step adjustments
induced directly by the depreciation. Dene H1 as the set of rms that adjust in the rst







i=1((1   )ki;0)=N)1= = (1   ) k(
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0 si;0dsi;0 = (   1)=log with probability one by the law of large
numbers. Let x denote that numerator: x 
P
i2H1 si;0=N. Note that i 2 H1 is equivalent to
0  si;0 < 1=q. Then the asymptotic mean of x is x0 =
R 1=q
0 si;0dsi;0 = (=q   1)=(log)
and, by the central limit theorem,
p
N(x   x0) converges in distribution to the normal



















We regard the right hand side of (41) as a function F of x. By the delta method, we obtain
that F(x) asymptotically follows the normal distribution with mean F(x0) and variance















This cancels out with the second term of the split m1=
p
N. F 0(x0)2Avar(x) is calculated as
2
1 in (12). Then, m1=
p
N asymptotically follows the normal distribution with mean zero
and the variance 2
1. This completes the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 2
We focus on (m1 + M)=N, since Lemma 2 implies (logK   logK0)=log  (m1 + M)=N.





















































mu asymptotically follows a martingale branching process when  ! 1 and N ! 1. By
the nature of the branching process, jMj conditional on jm2j is equivalent to the jm2j-times
convolution of M conditional on m2 = 1. Using these facts, we obtain that:
Var(M=N j m1;m2)  jm2jVar(M=N j m2 = 1) (45)
E(E(M=N j m1;m2) j m1)  E(m2 j m1)E(M=N j m2 = 1)  m1E(M=N j m2 = 1) (46)
Also, jm2j conditional on m1 asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution with mean jm1j



















j m2 = 1





































j m2 = 1
!!2
(47)
Next we calculate limN!1 E(M=
p
N j m2 = 1), provided that the best response dynamics
reaches an equilibrium before all the N rms adjust. Namely, we take the expectation
conditional on M  N for a xed N by using the asymptotic probability function (38) when
 ! 1:
Pr(M = w j m2 = 1;M  N)Pr(M  N) = e
 ww
w 1=w!: (48)
By the property of a branching process with mean less than or equal to one, the probability














































N j m2 = 1;W  N) !
q
2=. Similarly we obtain:
E(M
2=N
1:5 j m2 = 1) ! 1=(1:5
p
2) (52)
Collecting the results, we obtain Var((m+M)=N) ! (2=)(1 +1=3)1. Hence, the capital
growth rate has an asymptotic variance (log)2(2=)(1 + 1=3)1.
E Derivation of Equations (50,51,52) in Appendix D
We use the inequality (51).
E(M=
p





































The second to the last line holds because e 1=(12w+1) is bounded by one.
Similarly, the lower bound turns out to converge to the same value. Let us note that the






















































N j m2 = 1;M  N) !
q
2=.
Similarly, E(M2=N1:5 j m2 = 1) is calculated as follows.
E(M
2=N








































































where the inequality in the fourth line holds since the function e 1=(12w)p
w is increasing in



























































In this section, we extend our uctuation results to the case where the distribution of initial
capital is not uniform or where the lumpiness and depreciation rate are heterogeneous across
rms.
First, we show the case of non-uniform distribution. Namely, we drop Assumption 1 and
let the initial gap si;0 to follow any continuous density function f0(si;0) dened over interval
[0;1). A few notations are to be developed.  K denoted the initial aggregate capital when
there are a continuum of rms. The inaction band is [ k; k) where  k = a0  K.  K is now
redened under the new density function f0 as:  K = (a0Ef[si;0]1=)1=(1 ). We construct
43an equilibrium aggregate capital ^ K when there are a continuum of rms. On the one hand,
^ K satises ^ K = (a0Eg[si]1=)1=(1 ). On the other hand, si;0 is mapped as:
si = bsi;0   1=q + (log  K   log ^ K)=logc (57)
where bc takes the dierence to the nearest integer that is less than the argument. This
mapping and the density function f0 determine the density function f1 of si with ^ K as a
parameter. Then ^ K and f1 are determined simultaneously. Note that ^ K might dier from
 K, because the gap density f1 may dier from f0 if f0 is not uniform.
Dene   as the density evaluated at si = 0 at the equilibrium in the case of a con-
tinuum of rms. Namely,   = f0(1=q   (log  K   log ^ K)=log). Also dene log ~  
(   1)=(Ef1[si;1]). We now obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that ki;0 follows any continuous density function that has support
[log  k;log + log  k). Then, Proposition 1 holds with modied constants ~     log ~ =log
and ~ 1. Moreover, the limit variance of the capital growth rate is strictly positive when ~  ! 1
and N ! 1.
Proof: See Appendix G
Proposition 5 states that the deviation from the uniform distribution of si;0 does not
change the parametric form of the distribution function of the aggregate growth rate. The
key parameter that determines the speed of exponential truncation is a product of the degree
of strategic complementarity  and other two factors:   and log ~ =log. The rst factor
represents the density at the threshold and the second factor indicates the aggregation eect
of the non-uniformity. The both factors are 1 if si;0 follows the uniform distribution.
The rst factor   has a particularly important implication. As the capital conguration
evolves over time, the density at the threshold may uctuate below or above 1. Thus, the
44uctuation distribution may attain the critical level ~  = 1 due to the uctuations of   over
time, even if  is less than 1 due to the decreasing aggregate returns to scale or the exible
wage and interest rate as we see in the dynamic version of the model. The time-varying
  has another implication on the volatility of the aggregate growth rates over time. The
aggregate growth rate exhibits higher volatility when   is high. This implies that the (S,s)
economies can exhibit the echo eect not only in the level of production but also in the
volatility.
Next generalization is to allow heterogeneity in the lumpiness and depreciation rate across
rms. Suppose that there are nite L types of rms with parameter values i = (l) and
i = (l) for l = 1;2;:::;L. Each type of a rm is drawn with probability (l), where
PL
l=1 (l) = 1. The lower bound of the inaction band becomes heterogeneous as k
i = aiK
where ai  ((
=
i  1)=(i 1))=( ). Other variables such as  K; ^ K; ki are dened similarly
as before.
Let    denote the density at si = 0 at the equilibrium when there are a continuum of








i ]). Then we obtain the proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose that ki;0 follows any continuous density function that has support
[log  ki;logi + log  ki). Moreover, i and i vary across rms, and they are randomly drawn
from a nite set. Then, M conditional on m1 = 1 follows the same tail distribution as (11):




for a large integer w, where       E[log  i=logi] and C0 are constant. The asymptotic
variance of the fraction of rms that adjust, (m1 + M)=N, is strictly positive when   ! 1
and N ! 1.
Proof: See Appendix H.
45Proposition 6 shows that our uctuation result is robust to the heterogeneity of rms. The
tail distribution is derived explicitly and shown to coincide with our previous result. However,
the exact distribution is obtained only implicitly as a form of the functional equation of the
moment generating function of M (see Nirei (2003)).
Empirical studies attest enormous degree of heterogeneity of rms, which tends to render
the collective dynamics of rms intractably complex. Nonetheless, the parametric form we
derived for the distribution of the number of investing rms still stands. We also note
that the heterogeneity accelerates the convergence of the rms' positions in the inaction
band to the simple uniform distribution in one-sided (S,s) economies as Caballero and Engel
(1991) observed. The uniform distribution of rms' positions provides an important reference
point in our model, even though we can derive the aggregate capital uctuations for general
distributions as shown by Proposition 5.
G Proof of Proposition 5
Randomly draw si;0 from density f0 for N rms and construct the initial capital si;0a0 ^ K
in the inaction band. Set the initial aggregate capital K0 at the aggregate of the ki;0. The
dierence between K0 and ^ K can occur only due to the niteness of the rms, and thus
logK0   log ^ K vanishes according to the law of large numbers.
The subsequent best response dynamics is dened similarly as before. The rest of the
proof proceeds similarly with some modications as follows. Dene fu as the density of
si;u. Then
PN
i=1 si;u=N ! Efu[si;u] as N ! 1. Since logk
u   logk
0 is of order 1=N, the
density fu converges to f0 as N ! 1. Then Lemma 2 is modied as N(logKu+1 logKu) !
mu+1 log ~ . Note that log ~  is equal to log if f1 is a uniform distribution.
Let us note that the conditional probability for rm i to invest in step u is the right hand
46side of Equation (37) times fu(0), because the density at the threshold fu(0) is not necessarily
equal to one without Assumption 1. Since logk
u logk
0 is of order 1=N, fu(0) ! f0(0) =  
as N ! 1. By combining this with the modied Lemma 2 as in the previous paragraph,
Lemma 3 holds by modifying the Poisson mean  to ~ . Then the proof of Proposition 1
holds by replacing  with ~ .
The 1 is also modied to ~ 1 so that the eect of   is taken into account. For i to be in H1
is equivalent to si;0 < 1=q (log  K  log ^ K)=log. Thus, the number of rms in H1 follows
the binomial distribution with population N and probability 1=~ q  F0(1=q   (log  K  
log ^ K)=log) where F0 denotes the cumulative distribution of si;0. Then the modied ~ 1 is
obtained by following the computation of 1 with applying ~ q and log ~ .
H Proof of Proposition 6
Let N(l) denote the total number of rms of type l and mu(l) denote the number of rms
of type l that adjust capital in step u.
First, we show the counterpart of Lemma 2 as follows.








































Dene Zu+1 as the right hand side of (59). It has mean mu+1E[log  i].
We then show that (mu)u follows a branching process. Let F1 denote the cumulative
47distribution function of si;1.
Pr(i 2 Hu;bi = b(l)ji = 2 [v=2;3;:::;u 1Hv) (60)
= (l)
F1((logKu   logK0)=log(l))   F1((logKu 1   logK0)=log(l))
1   F1((logKu 1   logK0)=log(l))
(61)
Thus mu(l) follows a binomial distribution with probability above and population N(l)  
Pu 1
v=2 mv(l). Considering that mv, v = 2;3;:::;u 1 are nite with probability one, we obtain
the asymptotic mean of the binomial as (l) Zu=log(l). Thus, mu(l) asymptotically
follows a Poisson distribution with this mean. Hence, mu =
PL
l=1 mu(l) asymptotically
follows a Poisson distribution with mean  E[log  i=logi]mu 1 =  mu 1.
The vector of Poisson random variables (mu(l))l conditional on its sum mu follows a
multinomial distribution with probability vector (((l)=log(l))=E[1=logi])l and popula-





i )). Thus, Zu conditional on mu is equivalent to a mu-times
convolution of a random variable. Then, mu+1 conditional on mu asymptotically follows a
compound Poisson distribution. Since a compound Poisson distribution is innitely divisi-
ble, (mu)u follows a branching process in which each rm in step u bears children in step
u + 1 whose number follows the compound Poisson distribution that has mean  . By the
theorem by Otter (see Harris (1989)), a cumulative sum of a branching process follows the
distribution as in Proposition. Finally, the process (mu) is nite with probability 1 if    1.
This completes the proof.
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